There are two things that puzzle me about this statement. First, once you seemed to accept tropes and deny both universals and facts. Now you seem to do the opposite (though your acceptance of either facts or universals is not to be read off from that statement). I do not know exactly why you accept facts. I ask because I am critical of facts, although in what follows I will not give any sustained arguments against them (what I have to say against facts is contained in Betti 2011a).
Second, I do not see why it should be necessary for any philosophy of facts to provide an account of the form of the expression 'the fact that p', nor do I see even that it would be important for such a philosophy to do so. Those who accept facts and take up an attitude that usually goes under the label of revisionary metaphysics, I think, would not find having such an account important. Revisionary metaphysics, as is well known, contrasts with descriptive metaphysics:
Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure (Strawson 1959: 9) .
So I see why a descriptive metaphysician accepting facts should care about the naming of facts; but I do not see why a revisionary metaphysician should: I do not see whether a revisionary metaphysician accepting facts should care even as to whether it is at all possible to name them. So I am not sure why you think it is so important for the revisionary metaphysician to have an account of the expression 'the fact that p'. Unless, of course, yours is not a neutral statement, but a statement made from the perspective of a descriptive metaphysician. But are you one of them? I am also not sure why you attach so much importance to Herbert Hochberg's account of the expression 'the fact that p' as a definite description. Again, I do not quite understand why his account would be of use to revisionary metaphysicians.
In what follows I will explain my reasons for bringing up the point I just mentioned. I shall also, moving from the debate on the naming of facts, offer a critical examination of the methodology of metaphysics that relies on language-based arguments. My criticism is that this kind of metaphysics often places the wrong kind of methodological emphasis on language data, and thus gives a distorted image of both the workings and goals of this methodology. And then I will ask you: do you agree?
Here's what I will do. In section 1, I introduce two kinds of facts, compositional and propositional: the first are tendentially defended by revisionary metaphysicians, the second by descriptive ones. In section 2, I briefly introduce an argument which I reconstruct as underlying the descriptive reasoning which defends facts drawing from the way we talk about them: I call it the Argument from Nominal Reference. This is an argument I distill from representative descriptive positions such as Kit Fine's, and in which the naming of facts by means of 'the fact that p' taken to be a singular term is an important presupposition. I then proceed to discuss Hochberg's analysis of 'the fact that p' as a definite description. My main criticism regards the circumstance that this analysis destroys the prima facie syntax of 'the fact that p' in natural language, that from the very start it builds in theoretical presuppositions as to what facts are, and that thus the descriptive metaphysician should consider it a useless tool. I say that for revisionary metaphysicians, by contrast, such an analysis is not particularly relevant, since no revisionary metaphysician should put much value in how we talk about facts: the only interesting question here is whether we should accept facts as the best candidates to play certain metaphysical roles. And the playing of such roles, in a revisionary framework, must be argued for by means other than linguistic analysis. In section 3, I go on to critique the methodology of ordinary language philosophy, maintaining that, far from being based on empirical findings of language use, the choice of linguistic examples made by natural language philosophers to support philosophical points about the nature of facts is question-begging; actually, it can be shown that 'facts' in natural language does not mean philosophers' facts. In section 4, I argue that the only possible position with respect to the notion of reference to facts is the position according to which facts are taken by stipulation to be the semantic value of certain expressions. It is possible to defend this position, however, only if we manage to show on the basis of arguments other than linguistic ones that we have good reasons to acknowledge facts. (I doubt that we can manage to show that, but never mind this here.) In doing all this I will touch upon the notion of ontological commitment, natural language paraphrases in metaphysics and the role of the translation into first-order classical predicate calculus, and the reliability of evidence given by the kind, quality, and scope of language-data as used in the descriptive metaphysicians' practice.
How many (conceptions of) facts?
There are two conceptions of facts: compositional and propositional. 7 semantically idle not statements, or propositions, though they are as fine-grained as propositions, and, like propositions, they are about something Identity criterion: two facts are identical iff (Empirical) they are necessarily equivalent, if they necessarily co-exist (Compositional) They have the same constituents in the same arrangement (Quasi-structural) the propositions to which they correspond are identical.
One interesting question that emerges from this classification is whether propositional facts (Fine 1982's terminology) are the same as the 'non-compositional facts' of philosophers like Plantinga, Pollock, and Barwise. Contemporary reference works 1 I characterize facts and their identity criteria in detail in chapters 1 and 2 (compositional) and chapters 3 and 4 (propositional) of Betti 2011a.
(including yours and Fabrice's, Mulligan & Correia 2008) ignore propositional facts,
leaving it unclear whether we should consider non-compositional facts a variant of the compositional ones after all, or whether instead they are an unfortunate mix of compositional and propositional facts. I am inclined toward the unfortunate mix reading, and prefer to stick with my taxonomy. The problem with classifying these 'noncompositional' positions on facts is without a doubt due largely to the problems of those positions themselves: they offer unconvincing treatments of (a) the criteria of identity for facts and of (b) the relation between a fact and the objects it is about (see Lewis 1986's criticism on pp. 174-191 of what he calls 'magical ersatzism' of Plantinga and others) and (c) the plausibility of the view that such facts can play the role of truthmakers. As to (b), non-compositional facts seem to be half-worldly entities rather than ideal ones, since, to speak with Meinong, they are superiora that do involve particulars as inferiora. The characterisation of a fact as 'involving' the particulars the fact is said to be 'about' in this sense is often attributed to propositional facts, too (but this is no help: it just complicates things, rather than clarifying them). As to (a) if we follow Wetzel 2003, we should say that the empirical identity criterion applies to noncompositional facts in the following way: a fact f is identical with another fact f' iff it is not possible that f should obtain without f' obtaining and it is not possible that f' should obtain without f obtaining (Fine 1982: 58; Pollock 1984: 52-56; Olson 1987) . This criterion yields a very coarse-grained conception (Wetzel sect. 5) which is plausibly applicable only to real, compositional facts, not to ideal, propositional facts. As to (c):
non-compositional facts are different from propositional facts and nearer to compositional ones in that non-compositional facts, like compositional ones, are taken to play the role of truthmakers, while propositional facts are not taken to play that role (the position of Searle, who seemingly both has propositional facts and has them play the role of truthmakers, seems an exception in the propositional camp).
It is not only hard to see on which grounds non-compositional facts, which are ideal (and thus necessarily existing) and unstructured, can be said to obey the empirical criterion and play the role of truthmakers, it is also nearly impossible to give a general characterization for these facts. 4 It is not by chance that fact-compositionalists tend to prefer a more artificial-sounding expression to name a fact, and that fact-propositionalists prefer by contrast a more natural-sounding one. For these two groups of philosophers tend to differ vastly in their methodological views of metaphysics and of the link between language and reality. Roughly, fact-compositionalists are tendentially revisionary metaphysicians, while fact-compositionalists are descriptive metaphysicians. They reply in a very different way to the question: why should we accept facts? Factpropositionalists tend to give reasons from language: natural language shows reference 2 Barwise's facts are different both from events (which he calls 'concrete situations') and from propositions -note that Barwise accepts all three kinds of entities, facts, propositions and events, even if it is unclear to me why he needs all three (Barwise 1989: 233, 260 4 To be precise, those who think that that-clauses are good names for facts do not argue that all that-clauses refer to facts, but only that some that-clauses do -more or less explicitly following Vendler's view that non-factive that-clauses refer to propositions while factive that-clauses refer to facts (I will not pay attention to this issue here; for more see chapters 4 and 5 of Betti 2011a; see also section 4 below.) to facts. Fact-compositionalists tend to give metaphysical reasons: we need facts because they are the best candidates to play certain metaphysical roles. The first group, but not the second, takes reference to facts in natural language to be a sort of incontrovertible datum and a crucial one at that. From this they conclude that there are (propositional) facts. It is the descriptive methodological attitude of the first group that I criticize in this paper.
In arguing for the implausibility of the claim that there is no reference whatsoever to facts, Fine observes
Surely when we say that not all of the relevant facts have been considered or that the recently discovered fact will prove critical, there is reference of some sort to facts, a reference that will show up either in the use of nominal or sentential variables (Fine 1982: 45) In Betti 2011a (chapter 4) I argue that in this passage 'surely' has as much argumentative force as 'obviously' in 'obviously, when I say that you did it for her sake, there is reference to some sort of sake' 5 -that is, zero. There is neither definite reference to facts nor indefinite reference to facts either. I propose the following argument (inspired by Quine, though not Quinean), as a reconstruction of the reasoning of Fine and others (Betti 2011a descriptions singularly name facts; I discuss these options below).
In the next section I will discuss Hochberg's account of 'the fact that p' as a definite description and find it either inadequate or irrelevant to the purpose.
Hochberg's analysis of 'the fact that p'
As a warm up, I start with David's attempt to account for the form of 'the fact that p.' Following a line of reasoning similar to that of other critics (Künne and Lowe), David objects that if 'the fact that p' "is a singular term, this cannot be because it is a definite description -it's not", but adds
Timothy Williams reminded me that we get a similar situation with 'the tallest spy is F', which seems to turn into 'there is exactly one x such that x is a/the tallest spy and x is F'. I think the comparison suggests the solution. In case of the tallest spy, one uses an analysis of tallestness: 'there is exactly one spy x such that x is taller than every other spy and x is F'. So we could use the PA [traditional, i.e. relational, propositional analysis of belief, AB] to help us with our case: 'there is exactly one proposition x such that for every S, S thinks that p iff S thinks x, and x is F'" (David 2002: 140 n. 18) .
One problem with this solution is that far from obeying it, it denies the so-called traditional propositional analysis of belief since nothing in this analysis reflects the identity of x and whatever is supposed to be denoted by 'that p'. Suppose now we agree on an analysis of this kind: 'there is exactly one x such that for every S, S knows that p iff 
5 A: Mmh. Fancy….How do you read that?
6 H: 'The unique fact f, such that it contains a as a Term, F as an Attribute, and is of the form Фz.'
7 A: I see. But the formula is an abbreviation and the iota operator is eliminable, right?
So now we take 'the fact that Fa is startling' with S for 'is startling', and write
Sιf(T(a, f)  A(F, f)  IN(Фz, f)).
We can remove the iota operator like this
And I suppose it's okay by you if I remove the (zero-place) variable f in this formula and introduce explicitly a (one-place) predicate symbol standing for 'is a fact', like this (and let's take another font, say Boopee, for this new symbol, f):
which we now read (i) There is a fact such that it contains a as a term, F as an attribute, and instantiates Фx;
(ii) There is at most one thing that is a fact such that it contains a as a term, F as an attribute, and instantiates Фx;
(iii) Everything that is a fact such that it contains a as a term, F as an attribute, and instantiates Фx, is startling.
And, as I understand you, 'term' here is a Russellian term, i.e. an individual, and F is a property.
8 H: Right.
Based on this dialogue, let's fix
Hochberg
The fact that Fa is G =df There exists at most one thing that is a fact such that it contains a as a term, F as an attribute, and instantiates Фx, and it is G.
Importantly, note that this analysis destroys the syntax of 'the fact that Fa' and has consequences for the semantics of this expression. In particular, the that-clause, 'that Fa' ('that p'), disappears. One might think that the analysis is for this reason selfdefeating, since by offering it we are removing prima facie linguistic evidence that the expression 'the fact that p' is a genuine definite description. For usually, expressions of the form 'The F is (a) G' are analysed as a conjunction of the following claims:
(ii) At most one thing is F.
And, indeed, according to analyses by Künne and Lowe, 'the fact that Fa (is startling)'
should be analysed as a conjunction of:
7 On description, see Ludlow 2009. (i') there is a fact that Fa (ii') at most one thing is a fact that Fa (iii') everything that is a fact that Fa (is startling).
But this is unsatisfactory, because the expression 'is a fact that p' is nonsensical: so one must conclude that 'the fact that p' is not a definite description (Künne 2003: 10 n. 23, 255 ; see also Lowe 1998: 231).
Suppose we insist that this is not entirely correct. Suppose we say that the very idea behind definite descriptions is this: an expression of natural language is a definite description when it can be given an analysis of the kind that Hochberg gives. After all,
Hochberg's analysis can be seen as including an existential claim, a uniqueness claim and, one could argue, a universal claim. Actually, we could say that, far from raising further complications, Hochberg's analysis seems conveniently to remove a problem, since it removes the expression 'that p', which, I maintain in Betti 2011a, is nonreferential and responsible for much trouble. Besides, in general Hochberg's analysis seems to perform quite well, as it manages neatly to distinguish the following two expressions:
(1) The fact that Plato was a power-hungry political amateur (is startling)
(2) The fact that Plato most feared (is startling)
(1') The unique x such that x is a fact has Plato as term, has being a power-hungry political amateur as an attribute, and instantiates Фx (is startling) (2') The unique x such that x is a fact and Plato feared x the most (is startling)
Unfortunately, not all is well. To see why not, let us first grant that Hochberg's analysis indeed provides an analysis of 'the fact that p' as a definite description (though on pain of destroying the prima facie syntax of the expression 'the fact that p', something that the other analyses mentioned above do not do). The main problem is that Hochberg's analysis builds directly into the analysans theoretical considerations as to what facts are.
I am not going to say that analyses of this kind should never be employed, or that they are misguided; I say only that they failed to achieve the methodological ideals underlying the Argument from Nominal Reference.
The first problem with Hochberg's analysis is that it incorporates specific determinations about what facts are and, consequently, is not general enough. It works at most for compositional facts, for it incorporates identity conditions for those facts:
from the same constituents in the same form (or structure or order) we'll always get the same fact. The facts one assumes by taking up this analysis have to be formally structured complex objects with minimally two constituents, one concrete (T) and one abstract (A). These characteristics correspond to three of the seven conditions I gave above for compositional facts. From this it can be seen that the objects whose apt definite description is the one given by Hochberg cannot be propositional facts. And there is more: Hochberg's analysis does not as such uniquely characterize facts so precisely as to exclude that the 'facts' in question are other things, namely integral wholes (substances) or mereological complexes (sums of tropes), because nothing can be derived from that analysis as to the kind of composition at issue, or as to the ontological status of the whole with respect to the parts ('constituents'): (Hochberg) could uniquely describe any of these three kinds of entities, facts, integral wholes or mereological complexes. 8 Now, since Hochberg is a friend of compositional facts, he likely does not mean by 'fact' either real wholes or mereological complexes. Yet this does not follow from (Hochberg) taken on its own. We could, of course, supplement the analysis in such a way as to ensure that the items purportedly picked out by the definite description are compositional facts and compositional facts only, by adding the other four characteristics or conditions I indicated in section 1 above, which would be needed to uniquely describe such facts. Let's now say, therefore, that any translation back to natural language is fine so long as it brings us back to a proper expression of natural language. But if so, then the following three options are all perfectly fine: Besides, indefinite reference to facts comes down to (truthful) applications of 'is a fact' to something. But, again, if this something is supposed to be a propositional fact, then, as long as it is not convincingly shown that propositional facts must be accepted alongside propositions (among others by rejecting the six arguments in Betti 2011a, 11 This seems quick, of course, but as I indicated at the beginning of section 2, I offer an extensive critical discussion of this point in Betti 2011a, chapters 3 and 4.
12 On this point, see Betti 2011a, chapter 3, where I argue from language data (and not using the metaphysical argument based on the collapse of propositional facts into true propositions) that 'is a fact' is not a genuine predicate applying to the objects falling under 'something' in 'something is a fact'. propositional facts in natural language, and that it's illusion to think that we do. In fact, the methodology of ordinary language philosophy as espoused by defenders of the Argument from Nominal Reference, which maintains that evidence concerning the nature of facts can be gathered by inspecting the various everyday uses of certain expressions in ordinary language, is question-begging. Although such an approach presents itself as being based squarely upon empirical data, in fact a number of highly technical theoretical assumptions are built into it from the very start.
The Argument from Nominal Reference relies, however implicitly, on Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. Criteria such as these are motivated by the recognition that language may deceive us, and that therefore we need to show how the expression 'facts' can refer to facts successfully, in a truly transparent way. The argument does not go through. Suppose now that the argument did go through: that would mean that we have argued in an effective way that 'fact(s)' must be taken at face value as referring to (a/the) fact(s), and that therefore we may accept that there are such things as facts. Suppose indeed that someone came up with rebuttals of all possible 13 I have assumed so far that among metaphysicians accepting facts, descriptive ones would have to choose HochbergProp and revisionary ones Hochberg. This is because, as I said at the beginning, the first tend to accept propositional facts and the second compositional ones. The reason for the latter claim is among other things that propositional facts cannot be convincingly said to play any metaphysical role. It seems fundamental to revisionary thinking that any category of entities would have to play some role to be metaphysically legitimate. I come back to this in section 4.
counterarguments (including those in my book) I raised against that argument as to definite and indefinite reference. In that case, it would become crucial for me to show that premise (3) in the argument for nominal reference is false, i.e. to show that quantification over facts in natural language is ineliminable. Or, alternatively, suppose we just forget the Quine-like criteria, and try to argue for the idea that 'fact(s)'-language should just be taken at face value without passing for any translation in first-order logic.
After all, there have been philosophers -ordinary language philosophers -that rely on the mere use of certain words in natural language (often just English) to assume that the things named by such words exist. For doesn't it seem true in an embarrassingly trivial way that 'facts' is a natural language expression referring to facts? Suppose we indeed agree that 'facts' refers to facts. Now, what would this mean? What are we claiming?
That there are objects that we name 'facts'; yet this does not approach even the shadow of a theory of facts. What, metaphysically speaking, are the objects we call 'facts'? A theory of such objects would need, like any metaphysical theory, to be explicit about whether, for instance, facts are entities in their own right, i.e. objects not reducible to something else -events, true propositions or whatever -perhaps by appealing to some theory of facts that has already been proposed. So we come back to the need to give identity conditions for facts, which in turn depends on a characterization of what sort of thing facts are. For, obviously, if 'facts' can be taken to refer to objects that are actually something other than the objects I have characterized as such, then linguistic arguments can do very little to support the claim that we must assume in our ontology facts as I have characterized them above. We can still agree on another meaning of the word, and still perhaps raise interesting questions, such as whether what we mean by 'facts' is apt to account for fact-talk in natural language or not -with the proviso that we agree, I
would say, that being apt to account for fact-talk in natural language is a role that must be played by some entity. However, the conclusion I come to as far as linguistic arguments for facts are concerned is that when facts are construed in terms of the two main theories I highlighted, there is no convincing argument that language carries 'natural' reference to such philosophers' facts. The best option in this respect would be to treat 'fact' as meaning grounded statement that we hold as true (and I am remaining
deliberately vague on what this might really mean).
The problem with usual ordinary language methodology that insists that the expression 'facts' refers to philosophers' facts (in the sense I fixed in section 1 above) is this: unless that methodology is accompanied by restrictions -restrictions that a philosophical community is prepared to share as methodologically acceptable -it will bring about a potentially useless proliferation of entities, and a conception of metaphysics as a discipline relative only to certain natural languages; again, often just to Suppose we apply this method to facts. As pointed out by Olson, who follows the etymological information in the Oxford English Dictionary, originally a 'fact' was a 'deed' 15 The Awkward Ring Rule is inspired by this: "The things that are true are propositions, and they cannot sensibly be said to be the case. The things that are the case (or that obtain) are states of affairs, and they cannot sensibly said to be true. So the predicates 'is the case' and 'is true' have not even overlapping extensions" (Künne 2003: 257, my emphasis) . Note however that Wolfgang Künne does not adhere unrestrictedly to a rule of this kind (see ibid.: 11 fn 25). I discuss the Awkward Ring Rule in chapter 4 of Betti 2011a.
or 'action', 'more often than not criminal' (Olson 1987: 10 (Olson 1987: 10) Olson rightly observes that none of these 'commits the user to facts as entities in their own right' (Olson 1987: 10) . Indeed, it would be most difficult to argue successfully that Juror #10: Now, look -we're all grown-ups in here. We heard the facts, didn't we? whatever can be stated as well as for whatever can be doubted. The whole point of the movie is that as long as the jury has a reasonable doubt, no one can be declared guilty.
It's quite hard to say when and how the philosopher's facts would enter the picture here. If we have to follow the view on that-clauses of Vendler (1967 : ) and others, whose views are considered authoritative by whoever wishes to defend the thesis that factive that-clauses refer to facts while non-factive that-clauses refer to propositions, then propositions can be doubted, but not facts, for 'doubt' is non-factive. Note that by saying this I do not mean to say that this enables us to conclude that the 'facts' of ordinary people are (true) propositions. We can at most, perhaps, conclude with Olson that 'even a philosopher may use the word 'fact' without talking about facts' (Olson 1987: 10) . Even if we were to grant that 'fact(s)' occurred in ordinary language exclusively in the meaning ad (2) above (and this is not the case), this alone would not be evidence that any of the philosopher's facts are meant specifically. It's not clear what 16 Notice that saying that 'facts can be stated' (Vendler 1967 : 144) or that they 'can properly be stated' (Clark 1976: 262) is compatible with all positions on facts, even those according to which facts cannot be named or cannot be the object of singular reference and those in which facts are just truthmakers of propositions (Clark 1975: 7 and ff). connection the word 'fact' in the expression 'That's a fact' has to the metaphysical notions of fact, namely those which see facts as entities at the level of reference. This is the reason why Armstrong chose the phrase 'state of affairs' for his technical notion of fact instead of the word 'fact': the word 'fact' is too much a term of ordinary speech. In particular, contemporary use ties it too closely to the notions of statement and proposition. (Armstrong 1997: 19) The idea might be that the expression 'that's a fact' is used just to endorse (or to assert the truth of) a given statement or proposition. (Armstrong 1989: 6) . If one is to believe the way people talk, there seems to be ample evidence that people often mean by A fact is a statement that can be proven true or false.
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In the light of this, it is unreasonable to insist that ordinary language use, or at least ordinary language use alone, commits us to either compositional or propositional facts as characterized by their defenders. Both the historical record and data on present usage offer evidence to the contrary.
Let me stress that I do not give these examples in order to claim that facts can (in fact) be false against those who hold the opposite view. The point is not to heap up evidence for either position by playing with Google, but rather to make clear that we will be unable to defend or attack either position -unable, for instance, to claim that 'false fact' is a wrong use or an exception to the right use -unless we make theoretical assumptions that tell us why this or that use is an exception or deviation from the use we think it is right.
Facts as semantic values
Maybe you agree on the critical points I put forward in the last section against the descriptive methodology of ordinary language philosophy. But I am not sure that you agree with the following claims as well, or to what extent. To me, all I have said so far means that there is no 'natural' reference to facts. And it means that the only sensible position on reference to facts is one according to which facts are taken to be the semantic value of certain expressions by stipulation (with the proviso we can convincingly argue by means other than linguistic ones that facts exist.) Here below I will try to make my point clearer.
In chapters 3 and 4 of Betti 2011a I establish that the only facts that that-clauses can refer to -if they refer at all -are propositional facts. I discuss the following claims as to the reference of that-clauses to such facts: Fact Reference, and its refinement, which I call Fact Reference Power! :
Fact Reference
whereas some (kinds of) that-clauses (are singular terms)
refer ( Accordingly, what certain that-clauses refer to is at most what 'true proposition' refers to, and this item is at most a Bolzanian proposition (notice that this is not the same as saying that any of these words can be exchanged in all contexts). 21 This leads to
Reference:
20 Where factivity is fixed as follows: Factivity: language exhibits a phenomenon called factivity; this phenomenon is linked to the implication or presupposition of truth of certain embedded clauses. 21 I show in Betti 2011a that it is not only legitimate to say that factive clauses refer to true propositions (or, if you prefer, that it's perfectly legitimate to take propositional facts as true propositions) -it is in fact a better option (if we assume that that-clauses are singular terms. Things like facts and propositions are theoretical posits justified by the metaphysical roles they play: this is why giving lists of characteristics that facts have and propositions don't -without arguing for those roles -is a definitory exercise, and won't be useful in metaphysics so long as no independent arguments are given for assuming (e.g.)
propositional facts alongside true propositions in our ontology. And this is also why Semantic Value is the only option for the semantics of 'fact'.
So, for instance, whoever wishes to maintain that there are no facts but only true propositions needs just to show that nothing is lacking from our ontological inventory if we do not have facts alongside true propositions, i.e. to show that all salient roles allegedly played by facts can be played as well by true propositions. Which, again, does not mean that the words 'fact' and 'true proposition' play the same role: that would be a lethal category mismatch, on par with saying that the word 'mouse' eats cheese.
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Again, I am not saying that it is correct that true propositions can take up all the salient roles played by facts; if by 'all the salient roles' we mean every role played by facts in all possible theories of facts. Then of course the claim is trivially false. Nor am I saying that the philosophical notion of fact is the same as the philosophical notion of proposition.
So the best position with respect to the naming of true propositions, as to the naming of facts, is simply that there is no such naming: at most we can say that true rather than attribute our views to the language that we speak, and hence to the speakers who share our language. What would entitle us to do that?" cf. also Varzi 2007. 23 Russell's theory of definite descriptions (which left us with a very limited set of singular terms), and Quine's criterion of ontological commitment (which left us with none) and the latter's ideas on the inscrutability of reference, all make a strong case against the prima facie aspects of natural language in favour of the idea that in order to take a rabbit from a hat we must first put it there. Of course this does not mean that taking rabbits from hats is not a respectable activity, but we should not fool ourselves in thinking that we did not put the rabbit there ourselves. It seems we must have the world in place before we can say anything about how we talk about it. If this is correct, then how can A1-A4 be remotely plausible? These claims just say that we can get to know whether an expression of natural language successfully picks out an object by inspecting either the translatability of that expression in a specific formal language, or the result of substitution of that expression with another expression of the same natural language, or its syntactic role as structural subject of sentence. Isn't this strange? Honestly, I think it is, and the only sensible question to be asked here would be: are there facts (or propositions) which can play the role of referents of that-clauses (if we deem that role necessary), or are there not? If there are facts, then that-clauses (or any other expression we might think suitable, such as 'the fact that p' in Hochberg's account) can hope to pick them out; if there aren't, such hopes are vain. If this is correct, most of the discussion on linguistic arguments -taken as an effort to establish that propositional facts exist alongside propositions -is futile and hopelessly question-begging. If no notion of fact as an item at the level of reference is metaphysically acceptable (and I say it is not), then the effort to take our fact-talk at face value in some way is metaphysically worthless. Do you agree?
Some philosophers would be unwilling to drop a first-order account of that-clauses (the one mentioned in A2 above) unless they are given some alternative way to treat them formally. (I myself don't see any good ground for reasoning in this way, but it is quite widespread; I do not know whether you accept this view.) Such an alternative 
Conclusion
In the preceding I have supposed a rather clear opposition between descriptive and revisionary strategies. But the position that you, Kevin, seem to favour is a position which seems to lie in the middle of these: you accept compositional facts, but still think it important, even necessary, to give an analysis of how we name them in natural must accept compositional facts. We now can stipulate that 'fact' in natural language, at least in some uses, applies to these facts. We can now hold that facts as metaphysical posits have always been present in philosopher's theorizations -it just happens that the development of English is such that, at present, ordinary language includes a certain use of 'facts' that can be harmonised with it. One problem with this is that it is false: facts were introduced into philosophers' theorizations only very recently (I show this in Betti 2011b). But this problem can be solved by saying that ordinary language includes, at present, a certain use of 'facts' that can be harmonised with facts as they have emerged recently in philosophers' theorizations (and which Armstrong calls 'states of affairs').
Would you put things like this? Is this 'harmonising' something you could agree to? Or would you want something stronger?
I don't think we need anything stronger. I should also say that in light of less costly and more elegant alternatives, it seems wrong to insist that we need facts to play truthmakers (I argue this in Betti 2011a, chapter two.) But if we could show that we do need facts as truthmakers, we could design a language that does justice to our theory and thus contains a genuine predicate 'is a fact' which would apply truly to certain specific objects by stipulation. Note that this does not need to be a formal language: by this designed language I mean just a language including technical terms apt to express our philosophical theorisations. The language in which this paper is written is not so far from a technical language of this kind. Facts are best regarded as the semantic value of certain expressions by stipulation: this is the sole acceptable methodological option as to the commitment of ordinary language to facts. In this case, we would take 'that p is a fact' to be true in a regimented language that matched an ontology of facts. One could take 'the fact that p' to be analysed as Hochberg proposes, but in fact any other analysis, or any other naming ('naming' intended here as weakly as possible) would do: why not 'A's being b'? What makes Hochberg's analysis better? When the link between natural and regimented or formal language is broken (and it can be argued that it is in fact always broken), then any choice would do: it's a stipulation, we just need to agree on what entities we are going to assume and how to talk about them. We just maintain that the semantic value of 'that p' (in some cases) and of 'the fact that p' are facts when we speak, no matter what natural language implies.
